In Memorium

Our thoughts and prayers go out to the family and friends of Michael Bhatia, as well as to the members of the HTS community with whom he worked. Michael was an HTS social scientist on the Afghan 1 team, killed last week in Afghanistan.

Warner's inquiry, and more feedback

One big development in the last week:

We've received notification from Senator John Warner (R - VA), a senior member of the Armed Services Committee, that he's submitted an inquiry to the Army based on the documents they've received, including the packet that Zenia and I submitted. This is a very encouraging development -- in addition to his extensive background with the military, Sen. Warner has been an important voice on the intersection of Homeland Security and Government Oversight.

If anyone wasn't comfortable addressing concerns to POGO, but is interested in providing feedback for this more "official" inquiry, you can mail statements or documentation here:

1003 FIRST UNION BANK BUILDING
213 SOUTH JEFFERSON STREET
ROANOKE, VA 24011-1714

Or, if you prefer to remain anonymous, you can also send a fax to 540-857-2800.


High Noon....
A few weeks ago, we received anonymous correspondence from someone within the program. First off, we're grateful for your coming forward -- attempts to discredit our feedback have focused on the fact that my most recent direct interaction with the program was January and Zenia's was December, so corroborating input from current members is very helpful. Unfortunately, the email address was flagging the spam filter, and we only saw it yesterday. If you read this post, check that account -- Zenia has sent you a reply.


On that note, thanks to all of the HTS participants and bystanders who have reached out to us privately or anonymously in support. The most helpful thing for the process will remain those who have been willing to step forward and provide written feedback through POGO, Congress or other venues. However, these private messages of support and corroboration do much to remind Zenia and I that we are not alone in our assessment of these problems or our desire to remedy them, and that we are speaking for a number of people that have too much to lose to speak for themselves.

Provide your feedback

A few days ago I posted a copy of our detailed statement to the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), where we describe program shortcomings in recruiting, retention, training and execution. The following few days were a visceral reminder that many others have experienced some of these shortcomings first hand--both as HTS members and customers--and are interested in corroborating or expanding on them in detail.

For those interested in doing so that haven't already reached out to us, you can provide completely anonymous input to at this website, or email your input to this address: info--AT--pogo--DOT--org.

HTS in Hindsight - Newsweek and POGO

Most of you should be able to guess that I shut this site down (or at least stopped posting) upon my return from Iraq in January. [That last post was just an email sent to my entire address book, but I had forgotten that I had enabled Blogger's helpful post-by-email function to get around Army web-censors.]

It turns out, though, that even out of Iraq, I'm not quite through with HTS. In recent months, it has become increasingly clear that my fiancée, Zenia Helbig, was released from HTS after repeated instances of identifying (and trying to fix) problems associated with the implementation of the program. However, since the pretext for firing her was a security violation, it has stymied her entire career in government before it could start.

Now, the only way to clear her name has been to demonstrate the veracity of our criticisms of HTS, and make the case that demonstrates that she was terminated for voicing these criticisms. I describe these developments not only to explain our active cooperation with the article in this week's Newseek, but by way introducing this statement that we submitted last month to the Project on Government Oversight. After appeals to her Congressional Representative and to the Army's Inspector General were ignored without consideration, POGO seemed to be the next reasonable recourse. Their initial response has been very positive, and we are working with them now to build the case. This is from the introduction of the statement:

"Below, I highlight a number of concerns with the program that I raised to program management and my superiors at British Aerospace Systems (BAE). As an academic partaking in my first experience in government, I naively thought that my suggestions for correcting these problems would be welcomed. Instead I was alternately ignored and threatened, until being ultimately dismissed... It is important that one critical point, explained in the middle of this document, be highlighted upfront: The focal point of the current breakdown of the HTS program is a conflict of interests created by program management’s competing incentive structures–they cannot fulfill their oversight responsibilities over BAE’s numerous failures to fulfill their contractual responsibilities without arming critics seeking the cancellation of the entire program."

In the full text, we go on to describe failings in recruiting, retention, training, contracting practices and oversight.

Ultimately, we both still believe in the program and how important it is for it to succeed in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Our intentions in raising these concerns while within HTS were always for the betterment of the program, and they remain so. The fact that clearing Zenia's name has become inextricably tied to this makes it more personal for us, but no more pressing.

For more back story, you can check out two previous posts from Noah Shachtman at Danger Room, Zenia's memo to Congress or her statement at the AAA conference. Stay tuned for more...

Back from Iraq

Hi all-

Just wanted to drop you a line and let you know I'm back from Iraq. A lot of you getting this email probably have no idea who I am -- sorry for that. Gmail automatically captures the address of anyone with whom you send or receive, which has left me with an address book that's far too large to manage. In my laziness, I'm just sending to all...

I'm currently demobilizing at Fort Leavenworth, and will be returning home to Charlottesville soon. Yes, for now, Charlottesville will be home. Zenia has one more semester of course work on the PhD, and I didn't make it back in time for UGA's semester anyway, so we'll be there at least until summer. After that, who knows? For now, I'm job hunting. We're still planning on finishing out the PhDs -- either at UGA, UVA or a player to be named later -- but for the right jobs we might put it off or walk away from it.

If you're curious, this article has a little about what I've done the last 8 months: http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/iraq/2007/11/30/the-pentagon-deploys-social-scientists-to-help-understand-iraqs-human-terrain.html

So that's it here. Thanks, all of you, for your thoughts and prayers, messages and care packages. They all meant a lot. It's been a really rough time for both of us, and we're still dealing with parts of it, but we're looking forward to a new start together. (If you don't know what I'm talking about, this is a brief intro to what Zenia's been going through, and what we're still dealing with as we try to repair what they did to her clearance: http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/4586. The issues I dealt with in Iraq are something separate, and took a lot out of me in their own ways, but not in any way that will have an enduring impact on me.)


Well, I hope that this finds you all well, and I'll talk to you sometime!

cheers,

Matt.

Scary, Sicko or Sick: What's in a name?

The International Crisis Group recently released a great backgrounder on SCIRI. If nothing else, it's helpful for finally putting to rest the group's preferred acronym since they dropped "Revolution" from their old name -- the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. (Apparently, we took care of that small matter for them.) You see, if you look in English language press since then, no one can decide if it's now SCII or ISCI or SICI or SIIC.* Originally, the group released a statement in May clarifying the English name as the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC). Somebody didn't like that, though, so they amended it later:

The new name in Arabic was Al-Majlis al-‘Aala al-Islami al-Iraqi, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council. Confusion in the media over the name’s translation – should it be SICI or SIIC in English? – led to an official announcement at the end of July that the English name would henceforth be 'The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq', 'ISCI'."

There's a lot more to the report than the name change, though. After an introduction to the group's history, and its role in the Iran-Iraq war, the report details at length ISCI's recent relationship with both the US and Iran, and the potential future for both of those relationships. Even here though, the name change offers fair insight into the group's complex and evolving relationships with Iraq's two biggest foreign... um... "partners":

"The name change was made to suggest SCIRI’s transformation from an exile-based rebel group associated with the Islamic Revolution in Iran to a responsible party of government in Iraq...

This clarification [of the official "ISCI" acronym] appears to have been made at the urging of SCIRI’s backers in the Bush administration, who were concerned about the possible negative connotation of the words 'siic' and 'sici', which are close to the English 'sick' and 'sicko'..."

And no, I'm not making that last sick/sicko bit up. (Al Kamen can even vouch for it.) Never thought I'd say this, but if "sick and sicko" are the extent of our forethought these days, then the steady hand of Karl Rove at the helm of the spin machine is sorely missed...

A closer look at the group is valuable though, as they continue to play a pivotal role in the future of Iraq. In October, ISCI made a much-remarked and widely heralded agreement with its erstwhile rival, the Jaysh al Mehdi, led by Moqtada al Sadr. However, numerous reports and analysts have suggested that the truce is just a political show, and that conflicts between the two groups continue unabated.


*For what it's worth, here's a google scorecard for the terms:

Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council SIIC	27,400
Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq SICI	16,700
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq ISCI	606
Supreme Council for Islamic Iraq SCII	32

Obviously, somebody (quite a few somebodies) didn't get ISCI's memo. Whatta bunch of sickos.

Playing with Numbers

There's been quite a bit in the press lately--Iraqi and international--about refugees suddenly returning to Iraq in droves. However, other reports have suggested that all the hype is just a government PR job that's been particularly effective, and that the numbers are pretty exaggerated.

This is important stuff, since it wasn't that long ago that all the reports were about refugees that were leaving the country in droves, or about the countries turning them away and the horrible conditions they faced in the few countries that would accept them.

Of course, all of this is beyond Iraq's internally displaced persons (refugees that don't cross a border)--both current and historical--and groups whose plight is so desperate that they came to Iraq as refugees.

It's no surprise that every little development gets lots of play in the media, though; as one of the reports noted, "returnees have essentially become a currency of progress".

The psychology (and economics) of terrorism

An article in the current issue of The American discusses the origins of terrorism -- or more specifically, the origins of terrorists. The conclusion? The popular belief that terrorism is a nihilistic act born of poverty-induced desperation is not quite it. Specifically,

"the available evidence is nearly unanimous in rejecting either material deprivation or inadequate educa­tion as important causes of support for terrorism or participation in terrorist activities. Such explana­tions have been embraced almost entirely on faith, not scientific evidence."

Actually, most terrorists really are committed true believers, willing to die for their cause. Within the Muslim world, the researcher found a positive relationship between level of education and support for terrorism -- the higher your level of education, the more likely you are to support terrorism against Western (including Israeli) targets. Suicide bombers also tended to be better educated than the average population. He didn't find any strong correlation at all with wealth or poverty, although some evidence even suggests that suicide bombers had a slight tendency to come from a higher average socio-economic background than the rest of society.

What does this mean? That addressing terrorism is about more than addressing poverty, or putting military-aged males to work. (Although these things never hurt.) Fortunately, efforts are underway to address more than just poverty as a source of terrorism. Normally, I'd be a little leary of an American effort to introduce "religious enlightenment," but we've reached the point where it's time to give just about any innovative approach a try. Maybe we can just take a page from the Saudi's book, and distract them with Playstations...

These are important issues to address since another recent study finds that as a military tactic, the suicide bomber is increasingly "effective, numerous, adaptable and sophisticated."

Two things are important to remember with all of this, though. First, like any other social science, it's grossly oversimplistic to try and reduce a social phenomenon to one singe cause (such as economics or religious beliefs). You're doing great to even get a primary cause...

Second, and more important, is to recall that these studies are about global terrorism, and not an Iraqi insurgency. There might be significant overlap between these two phenomena, but then, there may not be. It's recently been suggested that little of the violence in Iraq (even little of the Sunni-insurgent violence) is related to the Salafi/Takfiri-type Al Qeada attacks. There may be something to this, since there's plenty to indicate that violence in Iraq has much more to do with political, religious or personal conflicts, or even plain old, racketeering-style profits.

Military Tourism

This post might not be all that relevant for the units the HTTs are here to support -- military tourism is hardly something most maneuver folks here are guilty of. But it was one of my biggest pet peeves when I was here last time--in the Green Zone--so I couldn't help but be disgusted when I stumbled upon this. The mentality associated with walking around this nation like it's your own little sight-seeing trip stuns me. You look at the backgrounds of the authors - a CA guy and an NGO guy - and you just expect better of them. Instead, every local they saw on their sight-seeing wound up seeing the ultimate in ugly American tourists. How can we claim any credibility in anything we do when they see that this is how seriously we take the responsibility we have assumed by doing what we as a nation have done here, and are claiming to do now.

I suppose it could be argued that by trying to explain the historical relevance of these sights, the authors are actually encouraging cultural understanding. It could be argued, that is, until you read tidbits like the fact that the 14 July Bridge was named for the 1985 revolution that overthrew the Hashemite monarchy. Yeah, that's right guys -- the Ba'ath Party finally thought to themselves "Hey, you know what? We're in the middle of a war with Iran, we've been running the country for almost 30 years, let's overthrow the monarchy!"

Thanks for the efforts you so very clearly expended in your time here, guys. There's nothing like a little understanding.

Arrested Development

There's a new article in Joint Forces Quarterly that has some useful observations on detention policies in a counter-insurgency. Among it's most useful observations: try not to arrest too many innocent people, be careful which confirmed insurgents you release and don't let them use your detention center as a training facility or base of operations. Ok, this should all be stunningly obvious, but it seems like one of the biggest problems with COIN doctrine are "practitioners" that read the manuals, say "duh, of course I would/wouldn't do that..." and then proceed to do the opposite. Too often, COIN seems to come down to having to do the smart thing that you really don't want to do. Hopefully, though, missteps will always be balanced with innovative ideas.

Governance Assessment

I'm a little behind, so this assessment from the Congressional Research Service is from earlier this month. It's a good rundown on the state of governance and security from Saddam forward, including the current state of things and options going forward (from partition to installation of a "strong man"). I'll keep to myself which of those going forward options I believe to be most culturally viable...

COIN in a Tribal Society

I posted some brief things a few weeks ago about COIN in a tribal society, but this longer monograph just went up on the SWJ blog. It's by William McCallister, the cultural adviser mentioned in a vignette I referred to a few weeks ago...

DOS Iraq Status Report

Think of this briefing as the national, embassy version of an O & I update. Not a lot of interest or utility for those of us focused on a local level, but still interesting for visibility on the national picture (or at least what's being reported...)

The "Other" Culture

When we talk about the HTTs being here to provide advice on local culture, we're talking about culture as the fabric that binds individual people into a society: religion, politics, power structures, language, organizations, economics, history -- everything. The other type of culture, though -- what you can call the arts, or high culture -- is one small part of that bigger, more important culture. Understanding this other type of culture is not necessarily something that offers immediate utility, but it's another chance to gain an insight on Iraqis - or at least some Iraqis.

You can see from the tags below that this stuff falls squarely into the "shallow news" tag; Some of these stories (the folklore story, the orchestra story) probably don't really reflect life for the majority of Iraqis. But these are all layers of what's going on here that a lot of us can forget about pretty easily...

An Iraqi singer performs Iraqi and Iraq-inspired pieces in Beirut, because "violence and oppression is killing their cultural identity" and "the meaning of tradition... has been lost in Iraq."

Nonetheless, the Iraqi National Folklore Ensemble and Iraqi National Symphony Orchestra continue to practice in hopes of soon performing again. But practicing or not, the singer's point might be driven home by the fact that the Folklore group has to practice in a secret location, and the Orchestra can't seem to keep their best musicians from fleeing the country.

Average Iraqis, though, still turn to the TV. Power may be limited in a lot of places, but the first thing anyone does when it comes on is hit that "on" switch. News is rarely the first choice, though -- favorites are Egyptian soap operas, the latest political satire, or good old escapist cartoons, movies and music videos.

Life during Ramadan

This short article isn't particularly hard-hitting, and doesn't offer any broader observations or insights. It's just a brief vignette about local Iraqi life during Ramadan...

NGOs and the choices they face

This new report from Tufts discusses the choices NGOs in Iraq are faced with -- working with the military vs. being seen as colluding with them (vs. being used by them); the fact that the humanitarian assistance that is often most necessary is usually the assistance that it is most dangerous to provide; trying to remaining neutral in a place where it's impossible to do so vs. the benefits and costs of explicitly or implicitly choosing one side.

Beyond NGOs, these are the dilemmas most Iraqis face in their daily lives -- particularly those that want to take an active role in their society by being involved with CF, GoI, SIIC, JAM, etc. These are dilemmas that it's good to understand, and important to be mindful of...

Sunni and Shia engagement: effects of the surge

The lion's share of this article, as is clear in the title, is about the effect of the surge on engagement with and among the Shia. The most interesting analysis to me, though, is the first section discussing Sunni engagement, where the author points out that if nothing else, the Sunni leaders we've been dealing with since starting the surge have far more legitimacy among the Sunni than anyone who's been willing to deal with us previously. It kind of drives home the distinction between dealing with legitimate leaders on whatever terms we have to and trying to create leaders out of whatever shmoes are willing to deal with us on our terms...

Tribal Engagement

This piece just came out on tribal engagement -- it's a great introduction to dealing with tribes in this environment. You can also check out this piece about factors unique to a tribal insurgency.

HTS in Afghanistan

CSM had an article last week on the HTS Team in Afghanistan...

IDP Update

It's no big secret that IDPs have become a big issue in Iraq -- it's a big part of the sectarian stuff that's been going on (along with a general refugee problem...) This week, an organization that specifically addresses the issue of displaced persons in Iraq released its mid-2007 assessment. An assessment of the IDP camps (from July 07) and a report specific to Baghdad IDPs (May 07) are also worth a look. Reports on the other governorates can be found here. Meanwhile, a recent article describes the life of Iraq refugees elsewhere in the Arab world, while another claims that the surge has increased the number of displaced persons....